Temporality and joint commitment in railway planning by Boholm, Åsa
 * asa.boholm@cefos.gu.se 
 
 
 
 
Centrum för forskning om offentlig sektor – Center for Public Sector Research 
www.cefos.gu.se 
Temporality and joint commitment  
in railway planning 
CEFOS Working Paper 10 
2010 
Åsa Boholm* 
CEFOS 
 
 
Abstract 
Decisions are seen from a phenomenological lens focusing on their characteristic tem-
poral and flexible structure of meaning. In a bureaucratic social setting emphasizing pro-
cedural rules, legal constraints and formal rationality the temporality of decisions can 
prove to be problematic. The physical planning of transport systems infrastructure pro-
jects is characterized by high level of social, material, technical and regulatory complexi-
ty. Drawing on ethnographic observations of railway planning meetings this case study 
explores how decision processes over time are shaped by the inter-dependency of plan-
ning actors, their co-ordination of action and adaptive expectations. The paper contributes 
to the understanding of the interrelatedness of decision processes in organizational con-
texts, following a “messy” logic of practical and material considerations, negotiations of 
what is to be considered to be of value, and not the least, post-hoc rationalizations. 
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“The decision itself is neither something in the past nor something in 
the future, and it is neither the one side nor the other of the alternative” 
(Luhmann 2005, p. 88) 
Introduction 
A cornerstone of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of time is that, in terms of con-
sciousness, time is subjective, immediately sensed and lived within a ‘temporal horizon’ 
that structures perceptions and action (Gell 1992, p. 221f). Influenced by Husserl’s theory 
on the restriction of experience and determination of meaning, in his theoretical account 
of the ontology of a decision, Niklas Luhmann focuses on the frame of reference and 
reflexivity of the observer’s perspective (1995, p. 82 ff., 294–7; 2005). What is or what is 
not a decision depends on the relationship between actions and expectations, and on the 
attribution of intentions within a time dimension (Luhmann 2005, p. 85). According to 
common sense, decisions are acts of selection and choosing between alternatives. How-
ever, decision making has a complicated temporal structure, and a decision can change in 
quality depending on when it is observed, i.e., before, during, or after the decision making 
(Luhmann 1995, pp. 296–7; 2005, pp. 85–9).  
 
… the decision before the decision is a different decision from that after the deci-
sion. Before the decision it is an open alternative; in other words, it is an open con-
tingency. Several decisions are possible, or so it is said. After the decision the con-
tingency becomes fixed; and we only see that the taken decision could have been 
different. (Luhmann 2005, p. 89) 
 
The emergence of ‘alternative horizons’ of a decision implies a reframing of choice, and 
thereby of the decision and its meaning structure (Luhmann 1995, p. 297). A decision is 
thus inherently flexible, having both an open and closed meaning structure (Luhmann 
2005). According to its paradoxical ontology, a decision is closed since it freezes a choice 
between a selection of identified alternatives; at the same time, the choice and the alterna-
tives can be reassessed, opening them up for reinterpretation and restructuring the mean-
ing of what a decision ‘is’. The temporality of decisions and decision making therefore 
offers multiple reference points for an observer, pointing to the past (no longer changea-
ble), present, or future (still in flux) (Luhmann 2005, p. 89) and allowing flexible, relative 
horizons of choice.  
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Another fundamental idea in Luhmann’s theory is that decisions instigate action, in 
turn creating expectations about future action. The crucial point is that a gap exists be-
tween decision and action, since action does not follow from decisions in any logical or 
causal sense. A decision indicates commitment to future action by confirming an inten-
tion to act (Bratman 1999, 2007); in doing so, it ‘absorbs’ uncertainty about future cours-
es of action. As it confirms an intention to act, a decision directs future action by accept-
ing the premises for a decision and using them as conditions for new decisions to follow 
(Luhmann 2005, p. 96). However, the temporal continuity of decisions generating suc-
ceeding decisions from the original premises can be broken; decisions are often reconsid-
ered and changed, so that new choice horizons are created from which new decisions 
arise. This is part and parcel of the reflexivity of the human mind (i.e., reasoning and 
communicating according to multilayered external and internal perspectives on self and 
other) within an ‘ecology of life’, enabling the adaptive planning of action in the face of 
changing environment and life circumstances (Ingold 2000).  
In everyday life, reopening decisions is not always a major problem. We often change 
our decisions and intentions to act, due to new information as well as altered preferences 
and priorities, and by re-evaluating decision stakes, options, and benefits (Bratman 1999). 
In collective action, when we do things with others and depend on their actions to reach 
goals, changed decisions can be more problematic. In collective action, we must com-
municate reopened decisions and any changes of plans. For example, we are planning to 
paint a house together and have a collective intention to carry out this project; if I decide 
that I want to paint it red instead of blue, as originally decided, reopening the house col-
our decision must be considered and negotiated. Everyday life is full of such events, 
when we reopen collective decisions and negotiate what new decisions should or should 
not follow from those already made.  
Social conventions govern how collective intentions are remade; for example, any 
change of plan affecting others’ commitment to action should be justified (Bratman 
1999). In everyday circumstances, demands for such justification are not very strong, and 
that a person simply no longer feels commitment to an earlier collective decision (e.g., to 
lunch at a particular restaurant or draft a research application with colleagues) can consti-
tute a bona fide argument for a changed line of action. However, the stronger the com-
mitment of the others to a joint decision, the stronger the demand for accountability and 
for justifying the reopening of a previous decision. If I know that my colleagues have 
spent considerable time working on a joint research application, the argument that I no 
longer feel committed to the application would create hard feelings. I would be expected 
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to present a much more reasoned argument for the group to decide to stop working on the 
proposal.  
In the administrative bureaucracy domain, reopening formal decisions is even more 
cumbersome. Bureaucracy is a form of hierarchical, task-specific social organization 
driven by formal rationality adhering to explicit procedures and in which decisions must 
answer to criteria of rationality (Simon 1947). In a bureaucratic organization, issues are 
dealt with according to a legislative order of principles, by officials with jurisdictional 
authority to make decisions (Weber 1978, Vol 2. p. 956 ff.). Although signed by an indi-
vidual official, a bureaucratic decision is collective in that it is anchored in an organiza-
tional hierarchy: (nontrivial) decisions must be in line with the opinions of key adminis-
trators or experts (Simon 1947). Since legal justice norms prescribe that similar cases 
should be treated similarly, and that decisions must be stable, transparent, and reasoned, 
reopening official decisions made by a bureaucratic organization cannot be done ad hoc, 
but must follow precise standardized procedures, being processed as formal complaints or 
legal appeals. A bureaucratic organization is also characteristically text based, generating 
masses of stored and filed documents that capture most organizational operations, deci-
sions, and reasons for decisions (Weber 1978, p. 957). The files constitute a kind of col-
lective bureaucratic memory of past decisions, choices, and reasons for selecting one 
alternative rather than another. They comprise a storehouse of documented ‘fixed contin-
gency’ or (frozen) past horizons of choice (cf. Luhmann 2005, p. 89).   
In the public domain, policy implementation generally requires decision making pro-
cesses that build on communication and on the cooperation and coordination of admin-
istrations and organizations (O’Toole Jr 2003; Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). The com-
plexity of joint action (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) derives from the many critical 
‘decision points’ at which decision problems, alternatives, benefits, and risks must be 
negotiated and agreed on. The sequencing of critical decision points according to an ‘as-
sembly line structure’ of interdependence (O’Toole Jr. 2003, p. 147) offers veto points to 
key agents. In the planning context of an administrative and bureaucratic organization, 
many participating agents are interconnected within a complex institutional framework. 
Planning can be viewed as a ‘shared cooperative activity’ (Bratman 1992) in which deci-
sions are nested in past decisions that condition current commitments, thereby framing 
what new decisions can or cannot be made. Policy implementation planning therefore 
incorporates an inbuilt ‘path dependency’ deriving from actor interdependency, the need 
for action coordination, and the role of an actor’s ‘adaptive expectations’, in that they 
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must plan their own actions in light of how they understand other actors’ planning 
(Pierson 2000).  
This paper presents a case study of reopened decision making in railway planning. 
The reopening of decisions is problematic in railway planning, since decisions are nested 
and have consequences for other decisions (Kleindorfer et al. 1993, pp. 12–3). We will 
examine the social conditions necessary for decision reopening, especially how planners’ 
expectations about the planning of others affect their understanding of prior decisions and 
their motives for reopening it and putting the issue on the decision table again. This actu-
alizes sense making, reaching agreement, and the assigning of responsibility and account-
ability in decision making (Vidaillet 2008). We will do this by exploring the nested struc-
turing of a temporal trajectory of decisions emerging in the planning of a new railway 
route. By following the framing and reframing of a decision problem through a planning 
process, this study addresses the reframing of the decision premises of a railway planning 
‘problem’ and how this contributes to the restructuring of a choice horizon. The aim is to 
shed light on the social establishment of a horizon of choice, the construction of its validi-
ty, and its re-evaluation during a planning process.  
The specific case to be addressed concerns the creation of a material structure, an 
‘engineering artifact’ (Suchman 2000), that is, a road/railway crossing. The decision is 
clear-cut, since there is only one problem and two alternative solutions: the road and rail-
way must not cross on the same level (according to transport policy goals for road safety), 
so the road should cross the railway line either under the tracks or on a bridge going over 
them. The decision problem must be solved and no third alternative is available. This 
railway planning project has a limited capacity to accommodate ambiguity deriving from 
conflicting interpretations or goals, since the road must cross either under or over the 
railway line. Other policy areas, such as education, often harbour a variety of conflicting 
goals and procedures without giving rise to glaring policy failures. To reach a bona fide 
policy solution, the planners (representing various authorities and stakeholders) must 
agree on one solution, and the choice will have consequences, including logistical ones, 
for further planning.  
What initially appears to be a fairly simple decision problem (i.e., mapping the pros 
and cons of the two alternatives and selecting the optimal one), given that the decision is 
part of a history of past decisions generating future decisions, turns out to be complicated. 
The temporal trajectory of the problem, previous decisions made, the existence of veto 
points, and the fact that decision making is a shared cooperative activity involving several 
mutually committed interdependent agents (Bratman 1992) who make decisions based on 
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their interpretations of the commitments and intentions of other planners and stakehold-
ers, add up to a complex social dynamic far from interest-based calculations of ‘hard 
facts’ as the game theory model of group decision making would predict (Kleindorfer et 
al. 1993, p. 241). 
The case 
The Swedish government has decided to invest SEK 10 billion (about EUR 1 billion) to 
upgrade road and rail capacity on the Norway–Väner Link north of Göteborg in western 
Sweden. An existing single-track railway will be upgraded to a double-track line dimen-
sioned for X2000 trains at speeds around 200 km/h. The new railway line promises re-
duced travel time, shorter intervals between departures, commuter stations, and environ-
mental benefits. Among several sub-projects is a route comprising approximately 14 kil-
ometres of double-track rail, including three tunnels 124–200 metres long and a 400-
metre-long bridge. The route traverses rural farmland as well as hilly areas covered with 
dense pine forest and it passes through two rural communities having just over 500 inhab-
itants each. The area is rich in archaeological and historic heritage and in natural conser-
vation sites, including the Slumpån river that passes through a spectacular canyon. The 
railway currently crosses the canyon on a steel bridge, built in the 1950s, that will be 
replaced by a new railway bridge; the construction and building of this bridge in a highly 
sensitive natural environment presents a major challenge for the project. 
Another challenge for the project is that the railway line crosses an open landscape of 
pasture that, according to geological investigations, consists of unstable clay. This partic-
ular landscape was noted in the railway investigation to be of unique value. The new 
railway line will cross several roads where all level crossings must be replaced by over-
passes or underpasses to avoid collisions between road traffic and trains. One road is the 
2018, which will cross the railway line where it passes through open pasture a few kilo-
metres north of the community of Upland. The passage through forested hills calls for 
several tunnels and deep mountain cuttings.1 The local communities and municipality 
generally favour the project and the selected route.2 Some citizens and affected landown-
ers are critical, but mostly regarding specific features that affect their own interests con-
                                                 
1 Dnr F07-2988/SA20, 2007-03-13 
2 Building commenced in 2009 and is planned to be completed by 2012. The railway investigation 
report was completed in June 2006; the matter was referred by the National Rail Administration to 
the government in March 2007 for permitting, which was finally granted and announced in May 
2008. In the meantime, the Rail Administration project management team of planners and design-
ers has worked on the railway plan for the selected route. The project budget is SEK 1.2 billion. 
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cerning access to land, land use, and crossings with roads in the area (the last issue has 
been a major source of local contention).  
This study builds on fieldwork conducted between March 2007 and mid autumn 2008 
by means of participant observation of project planning meetings, reference group meet-
ings (including authorities such as the County Administrative Board, the municipality, the 
regional public transport company, and the Road Administration), and consultation meet-
ings with stakeholders, all concerning planning for the railway project. The meetings 
were documented in field notes taken during observation. Data also include internal doc-
uments, minutes, official reports, National Rail Administration (henceforth ‘Rail Admin-
istration’) handbooks and standards, and records of informal discussions with officials, 
planners, designers, and consultants. In all, 23 meetings were observed. 
Railway planning in brief 
Land use planning for infrastructure facilities such as railways, for power plants, waste 
disposal facilities, or other technological facilities, actualizes many possible consequenc-
es. Planning must take into account an array of intended outcomes, unwanted side-effects, 
and uncertainty (Boholm and Löfstedt 2004). Furthermore, the societal benefits or harms 
associated with a project, including risks to humans and the natural environment, are sel-
dom understood and prioritized according to a single frame of reference (Boholm 2009). 
Planning entails complex joint action (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) involving many 
stakeholders, local communities, citizens, and authorities with diverse sectoral responsi-
bility, power resources, and rationales for making decisions (Boholm and Löfstedt 2004; 
Flyvbjerg 1998; Suchman 2000). The coordination and cooperation of institutions and 
agents over time is crucial for successful ordering of the material ‘engineering artifact’ 
(Suchman 2000).  
Railway infrastructure is state owned in Sweden, and the national government deter-
mines investments in new lines and decides whether to upgrade or close down existing 
lines. The Rail Administration3 (RA) is responsible for the railway system, including 
provision of railway tracks, the signalling system, and electricity for trains, while the 
trains are run by private or state-owned companies that rent rail capacity from the RA. In 
2001, the RA production unit was deregulated and opened to market competition. Rail-
way planning is regulated by the Railway Building Act (SFS 1995:1649) and the Envi-
                                                 
3 The Rail Administration was an independent government authority up to 1 January 2009, after 
which several Swedish transportation authorities (for road traffic, aviation, railway, and maritime 
transport) were merged to form the Swedish Transport Agency. 
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ronmental Code (SFS 1998:808), while numerous other regulations and standards apply 
to a variety of railway planning responsibilities – technical, organizational, economic, 
legal, and environmental. The Railway Building Act states that consultation with affected 
property owners, municipalities, and regional boards and ‘others who might have a sub-
stantial interest in the matter’ (SFS 1995:1649, Ch. 2, section 5) is mandatory. Although 
providing stakeholders with certain legal rights, railway planning adheres to a Swedish 
technocratic regulatory style of consensual negotiation between governmental interests 
and elite stakeholders but involves limited public participation (Löfstedt 2005). 
The regulatory framework for railway planning establishes a number of major official 
decisions, such as licensing, as veto points (O’Toole Jr. 2003) that bear on the legality of 
a project. Large decisions grow out of numerous internal negotiations that involve the 
Rail Administration (including officials, planners, and experts), consultants, agencies, 
governmental bodies (including municipalities and County Administrative Boards), and 
various stakeholders (including local residents). Major decisions that require legal licens-
ing call for successive decisions in which planners are expected to consider various fac-
tors: benefits to society, local communities, and the environment; negative consequences, 
risks, and uncertainties; technical alternatives and solutions; costs in terms of time and 
money; and – not the least – legal and administrative demands and conditions. ‘Large 
decisions generate nested series of smaller ones. This is the typical “decision in principle” 
followed by elaboration and implementation in even more narrowly focused choices’ 
(Langley et al. 1995, p. 271).  
The railway planning stage is preceded by an investigation to identify several alterna-
tive spatial corridors for the railway line. These alternatives are described, compared, and 
assessed in terms of their consequences for traffic and society, environment, landscape, 
and building technique. The railway investigation also includes viewpoints and opinions 
on the alternatives from a broad array of stakeholders (i.e., other authorities, local citi-
zens, and interest organizations). After the RA has selected one corridor as the ‘best’ 
alternative for a future railway line, it presents the supporting arguments and applies to 
the government for a permit to continue with detailed planning of the chosen corridor. 
This railway planning stage includes the design of the line, bridges, tunnels, barriers, road 
crossings, and electrical installations, taking into consideration land use, landscape, and 
the environment. The plan must also take into account safety issues regarding future train 
traffic, technical installations (e.g., overhead lines for electricity and signal systems), 
construction logistics, and construction facilities (e.g., construction roads and locations 
for storing excavated material) along with organizational, technical, economic, and prop-
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erty rights issues. An environmental impact assessment according to the Environmental 
Code is mandatory. The property rights of owners are topical in this stage. Consultation 
with property owners, municipalities, regional boards, and other authorities are vital to 
the process of formulating the railway plan. 
The railway planning process results in a substantial document that precisely de-
scribes the design of the line. The law requires that the plan be made public if it entails 
substantial consequences for the environment, public health, or nature resources or if it 
encroaches on private property. After being made public, the railway plan can be legally 
approved by the RA board on the condition that the County Administrative Board has no 
objections. The County Administrative Board is the public administration unit at the re-
gional level with a mandate to coordinate various interests from a national perspective. It 
has supervisory powers to ensure that legal requirements are met, and it is an environ-
mental licensing authority issuing permits and setting conditions for permits for activities 
that are potentially harmful to the environment, in accordance with the environmental 
code.4  
Like other railway projects, the studied railway planning project is managed by a pro-
ject leader responsible for ensuring that the consultants deliver a plan according to the 
contracted agreements. The Division South of the RA has contracted planning services, in 
this case for the railway plan, the environmental impact assessment, and the so called 
“systems document” describing the new rail way line in detail, from the firm Rail Admin-
istration Consulting (RAC).5 The project leader is accountable to the RA hierarchy and is 
responsible for the financial and time planning of the project. Other Rail Administration 
officials taking part in the project include various experts on economics, environmental 
monitoring, quality control, information technology, purchasing, safety, and traffic con-
trol. The RA specialists possess competence in, for example, technical coordination, envi-
ronmental impact assessment, and property and land management. The RA Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment (EIA) co-coordinator and the land negotiation specialist participate 
in the project on a regular basis. The RAC head consultant is responsible for delivering 
the following: plans for the physical routing of the railway line; designs for the signal 
system and contact cables, railway bridges, tunnels, and overpasses or underpasses; and 
                                                 
4 See http://www.lansstyrelsen.se/vastragotaland/English/Departments.htm for a description of the 
Västra Götaland County Administrative Board. 
5 Rail Administration Consulting (RAC) was founded in 1998 and its competency in railway pro-
jecting and planning formerly belonged to the Rail Administration. Since 2001, RAC has operated 
on the market, competing with other consultancies for rail planning contracts from the RA.  
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the EIA document and all investigations pertaining to it, such as risk assessments and 
impact on flora, fauna, landscape, and cultural heritage.  
The social organization of planning work 
Railway planning is carried out under strict organizational and bureaucratic conditions, 
involving administrative logic (including schedule, budget, and legal constraints) and 
decision logistics, with a strong interdependency between decisions within a formal se-
quential planning process. Numerous planning problem-solving decisions must be made 
for the process to continue. The planners spend much of their working time in meetings 
that constitute the modus operandi of railway planning, since they serve to coordinate 
planning and action to ensure that agreement is reached regarding the interests of authori-
ties, stakeholders, and expert advisors. The railway project planning group is multi-
professional and incorporates a broad range of expertise. At meetings, participants can 
express reservations and articulate demands, making viewpoints and positions transparent 
in a semi-public space. Much of what is discussed at meetings concerns cooperation and 
the coordination of planners’ intentions and actions.  
Inside the group of planners: The project meetings 
Apart from numerous smaller meetings to coordinate work and discuss solutions for spe-
cific tasks, the project meetings considered matters relevant to the entire project. These 
meetings were generally monthly and fulfilled several functions: coordinating planning 
among specialists and sub-tasks, detecting critical issues by including a broad competen-
cy in discussions, and allowing the RA project leader to control and supervise the plan-
ning process in terms of scheduling, cost, and consultant ‘deliverables’. The meetings 
were structured using a formal agenda, provided by the RAC contract manager, that in-
cluded a checklist covering numerous items; every meeting included going through this 
list to check whether or not the issues had been dealt with, and the current status of each 
item was noted.  
The project meetings were led by the RA project leader and the RAC contract man-
ager. The meeting agenda came with the invitations, which were e-mailed to participants 
in advance. A project meeting normally included RAC project leader and contract man-
ager, the RA land negotiator, EIA co-coordinator, and occasionally other ‘in-house’ RA 
experts with competencies in relevant fields; additional participants included consultants 
sub-contracted by the RAC in the fields of, for example, geology, tunnelling, hydrogeol-
ogy, or environmental assessment. A total of 50 consultants were contracted by RAC to 
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complete various tasks pertaining to the railway planning project; not all were present at 
all the project meetings. These consultants included experts in geology, hydrogeology, 
tunnel engineering, railway construction technology, risk assessment, and ‘comprehen-
sive’ planning (i.e., competence in how various parts are integrated into a whole planning 
document). The project meetings covered a wide range of perspectives: practical, tech-
nical, theoretical, political, administrative, organizational, legal, and informational. The 
issues discussed included construction and design of roads, tunnels and bridges, flora and 
fauna, the behaviour of wild animals, landscape characteristics and values, geological 
investigations of ground conditions, farming and agricultural conditions, future traffic 
safety, stakeholders and their claims, and what opinions  other authorities might have on 
the project..  
I attended the project and reference group meetings regularly. The participants took 
little notice of me, however, when controversial remarks or comments were made around 
the table, when someone might ask me jokingly, ‘Are you writing this down?’. At the 
meetings, I took a seat at the conference table along with the others and opened my note-
book. I never considered using a laptop for note taking, because I wanted my presence to 
be as inconspicuous as possible. I took notes almost constantly during the meetings, even 
when the topics under discussion were highly detailed and technical and seemingly far 
from what I was interested in. Since the meetings were also attended by a secretary who 
took minutes, which were distributed to all participants including myself, I could compare 
my own much more detailed notes with the minutes. A problem I initially encountered 
was the highly specialized nature of the topics of discussion, the unfamiliar expert termi-
nology and internal jargon. After a while, I became more accustomed to this world of 
expertise and to the technical aspects of railway planning, and was able to follow more 
easily the subjects discussed, at least in broad terms. 
Communicating with other planners: The reference group meetings 
Another type of meeting was the reference group meeting, a forum for various outside 
agents and stakeholders, such as the County Administrative Board, the municipality 
where the railway was to be built, represented by a senior official from the technical and 
planning administration in charge of municipal planning and zoning issues, and by offi-
cials from the environmental administration in charge of environmental protection and 
biodiversity, the regional public transportation company, and the Road Administration, 
together with leading project members, such as the RA project leader, the RA environ-
mental expert, the RAC project leader, and the contract manager. While the County Ad-
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ministrative Board and the municipality were represented at every reference group meet-
ing during the study period, the regional public transportation company and the Road 
Administration participated only occasionally. The reference group meetings were 
chaired by a RA official who had led the pre-investigation of the studied railway line 
project. The chair was thus well acquainted with the project background, and he demon-
strated this knowledge by occasionally intervening to remind discussants of past concerns 
and considerations.  
The minutes of the reference group meetings were distributed to participants, 
and each meeting started by reviewing the minutes of the previous one. These 
minutes were sometimes revised if someone thought that what had been recorded 
was not entirely accurate. The minutes were not considered official documents; 
rather, they constituted semi-official documentation for internal use that con-
firmed project status and history and, most importantly, displayed the various 
actors’ positions and concerns regarding the myriad of issues discussed. The ref-
erence group took an interest in many matters, such as the transformation of the 
old railway line into a cycling route, what to do about central Upland and the area 
near the future station area, how to access local bathing lakes, how to organize the 
transportation and storage of excavated materials, and how to design road under-
passes and overpasses.   
What to do with road 2018? 
Preliminaries 
The railway investigation planning stage, which aimed to identify, specify, and weigh the 
alternative routes for the proposed line, had included substantial consultation with the 
County Administrative Board, municipalities, public authorities, stakeholder organiza-
tions, and members of the public. In the railway investigation report the open landscape 
north of Upland was identified as possessing value that should be protected from en-
croachment by the new railway line. This landscape was described as follows:  
 
North of Upland is vast open landscape around the Lillån watercourse. The land-
scape is essentially a flat outer part of the canyon landscape surrounding Slumpån 
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… The landscape is characterized by long unbroken views. Farms are situated at the 
edges bordering on the forest. (author’s translation)6  
 
Later in the same section on environmental impact, the report characterizes the open 
agrarian landscape as follows: 
 
The landscape has great potential as a source of knowledge of the agrarian and set-
tlement history of the area. … In general, this district has been treated gently by 
modern society. The major change in the landscape was the construction of the rail-
way in the nineteenth century, when the station in Upland was built … The railway 
was located on … ancient farmland dating to prehistoric times. (author’s transla-
tion)7  
 
To protect the ‘open agrarian landscape’, the railway investigation report argued that road 
2018 must cross under the railway line to minimize its visibility in the landscape. 
 
The public road 2018 needs to be relocated under the railway. The line of the road 
and its design needs to be investigated in greater detail in further planning (author’s 
translation).8  
 
This decision regarding road 2018, set forth in the railway investigation report, posed a 
complicated decision problem in the railway planning stage. We will now examine in 
detail how the planners came to disconnect their upcoming decision concerning road 
2018 in the railway planning stage from the previous decision in the railway investigation 
stage, and how they succeeded in reopening the decision that road 2018 must pass under 
the railway line. 
Road 2018 is going under 
At a project meeting early in the railway planning process on 24 April 2007, one RA offi-
cial stated, referring to the the railway investigation of road 2018, that it would be ‘advan-
tageous to have the road passing under the rail track’. However, he also noted that ideas 
                                                 
6 BRVT 2006:01, 2006-01-25, Norge Vänerbanan. Dubbelspår Velanada-Prässebo Järnvägsutred-
ning inklusive miljökonsekvensbeskrivning (MKB), utställningshandling., p. 37. 
7 Ibid., p. 45. 
8 Ibid., p. 37. 
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diverged within the project as to whether this was actually the ‘best’ alternative, since 
‘geotechnology wants to have it pass over the track, but an overpass would be too domi-
nant in the landscape’. At this project meeting, a conflict between preserving the undis-
rupted view of the landscape and geotechnical considerations was implicit, since the dom-
inant view was that the railway investigation decision should determine further planning.  
At the next project meeting, on 29 May 2007, when the road was discussed again, the 
RAC project leader stated ‘We are going under’. In discussing a local landowner who 
wanted to modify the railway route to accommodate a private road, the RA’s environ-
mental coordinator emphasized the value of the area: ‘The open landscape is Upland’s 
most valuable asset. This area must not be unnecessarily subdivided. There must be ac-
cess to the area for walking. It is very beautiful down there’. The underpass solution was 
not questioned at this meeting and, at the reference group meeting on 11 June 2007, the 
RAC project leader stated explicitly: ‘2018 is not going over! We are going under’. No 
objections were raised. 
However, two months later, at a project meeting on 22 August 2007, the solution for 
the 2018 underpass was discussed more thoroughly; this time, the conflict between the 
value of the open landscape and the geotechnological issues hinted at the earlier April 
project meeting was openly addressed. The RAC project leader said: ‘2018 goes under. 
The Road Administration has looked into this. There may be geotechnical problems. The 
underpass road would be expensive. It will go into stiffer clay. The groundwater can be 
lowered with pumps’. It was now recognized that there were geotechnical problems to be 
solved, but it was not suggested that the decision should be reopened due to these prob-
lems. A discussion followed about what technical investigations and measurements 
would be needed and about local landowners, who had started asking questions about 
what was going to happen with the road and railway crossing. At this juncture, four 
months after road 2018 had first been raised as an issue at a project meeting, the under-
pass solution emerged as problematic, due to several factors: geotechnological difficul-
ties, groundwater, economic factors, and local resident concerns. However, these prob-
lems appeared solvable and the underpass solution was not questioned.   
At the reference group meeting on 18 September 2007, at which participants dis-
cussed the upcoming EIA public consultation meetings for the railway plan, the RAC 
project leader stated that road 2018 was going under the railway but that groundwater was 
a problem. It was also mentioned that a Road Administration representative would be 
present at the public consultation meetings to inform about the alternatives for the roads 
and crossings (as noted earlier, the project involves several road crossings apart from 
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2018). A hydrogeological expert would attend the consultations to answer questions 
about groundwater. The Road Administration representative pointed out that the argu-
ments for roads going over or under the railway line had to be clear. After discussion of 
road/railway crossings, the County Administrative Board official raised a question and 
said that he had a message from Deputy County Governor Göran Bengtsson, who had 
given ‘clear signals regarding the Trollhättepaketet9 that the County Administrative 
Board should be supportive and adaptable. We are the long arm of the state. Göran 
Bengtsson has spoken to the Department. This does not have to be in any notes’. By this 
statement, the County Administrative Board official signalled that his administration was 
not intending to make trouble, meaning vetoing the railway plan, but was committed to 
mutual action (Bratman 1992, 1999). After further discussion about the roads, the RAC 
project leader commented regarding 2018: ‘Of course it is possible to construct a bridge, 
but there would be terrible embankments. The County Administrative Board would have 
a fit. The line is kept as low as possible in the open landscape. It is under two meters 
[high]’. The chair commented on this, saying that the solution reached by the railway 
investigation was excellent; the road passing under the railway. This was the first time at 
a project meetings or reference group meeting that the road overpass alternative was even 
mentioned (although rejected).   
Snow, rain, and hydrogeology 
A month later, at the public consultation meeting in Upland on 23 October 2007, the solu-
tion for road 2018 was one of the issues presented. The RA message was that the road 
should go under the railway at a depth of eight meters; a higher profile was undesirable, 
since the train traffic would then produce too much noise. Interestingly, the ‘open’ quality 
of the landscape was not mentioned at the public consultation meeting as a decision pa-
rameter for the underpass; the focus was instead on train traffic disturbing noise. Presum-
ably, this negative effect was deemed to be of more interest to local residents than the 
‘open’ landscape quality, understood to be of more concern to the County Administrative 
Board. Lively discussion ensued, and there were many comments and questions from the 
many local residents in attendance (around 100 people had come to the meeting) about 
                                                 
9 In 2004 the Swedish government decided to invest 10 billion SEK in road and railway infrastruc-
ture to support the SAAB car industry in Trollhättan from the threat by General Motors (the then 
owner of SAAB) to move car production abroad. This deal is popularly described as the “Trollhät-
te package”.  
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road 2018. Issues raised related to risks of flooding during heavy rains and of snow drift-
ing in winter in the road underpass.  
At a project meeting just a few days after the EIA consultation meeting of 26 October 
2007, lessons from the two EIA consultation meetings were reviewed and discussed 
among the planners. The solution for road 2018 was discussed extensively and, as can be 
seen from the following dialogue, the process was now moving towards reopening the rail 
investigation decision. 
 
RAC consultant: The consultation meeting wants 2018 to go over. There were a lot 
of questions about snow and water. 
RA project leader: This will be difficult with the County Administrative Board! 
Geologist: The preferable solution is for the road to cross on a bridge. On the west 
side, there is a small hill with firm ground. The problem is hydraulic – pressure from 
the ground. The road will cut into rock. A trough solution [for the underpass] must 
be sealed. It must be watertight. The rock can be blasted, but then water can leak 
under the trough. We can permanently lower the groundwater table, but that might 
affect the surroundings. I have always believed that the road should go over.  
RA project leader: I think this has gone very far!  
Geologist: There are no tightening layers of clay. 
RA project leader: We ought to have given geology a higher priority from the be-
ginning. 
Someone: What is the cost? 
Geologist: It costs money to build an embankment. The embankment must be high 
and must be strengthened. All alternatives cost money. [The embankment] will not 
affect the railway line or the groundwater. If we go under, there will be wells, pump-
ing stations, additional strengthening of the railway embankment, and maintenance 
measures for lowering groundwater. This is a risk.  
RA project leader: We said earlier that there would be enormous embankments 8–9 
meters [high]. The main argument was the open landscape.  
Geologist: It is my duty to point out complications.  
RA project leader: The values are the fields and the open landscape. We need to 
evaluate this very carefully. We need to sit in a group and decide on the best alterna-
tive.  
EIA consultant: The problem with passing over was dealt with in the railway inves-
tigation. 
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RA project leader: Those who live nearby will have a huge bridge quite close. 
 
A discussion developed about what a possible road bridge would look like.  
 
RA project leader: The pre-investigations of the roads were poor. I was not in-
volved. The one who did the railway investigation has quit. Can’t we just make the 
railway plan public without including the roads? We need to sit down soon and take 
into account landscape and geotechnology and sharpen the arguments. 
 
This meeting initially saw conflict between the geologist and the RA project leader. The 
geologist identified several difficulties pertaining to the underpass alternative, while the 
RA project leader was concerned about the change of course in the planning process, i.e., 
reopening the decision to choose the underpass and the RA’s commitment to the County 
Administrative Board on this issue. The County Administrative Board was expected to 
favour the underpass option, since it values the open landscape, which would be obscured 
by a huge road bridge. Another complication for the RA project leader was the local 
stakeholders, both those who favour an overpass, since they perceive the underpass as 
risky for traffic, and those who favour an underpass, since they live nearby and it would 
not encroach on their view. Economic considerations entered the discussion but did not 
resolve the choice, since both alternatives would be expensive. The project leader then 
distanced herself from the railway investigation, arguing that it was poor in quality and 
noting that the person in charge had left the organization (leaving no one from the RA in 
a position to defend the underpass alternative). The matter was resolved consensually, via 
new meetings to determine what to do with the problematic crossing and to identify new 
arguments for and against the decision alternatives. 
Re-evaluating the open landscape: An emerging new horizon 
At the next reference group meeting, on 30 November 2007, the RA chair noted that road 
2018 was a ‘difficult question’. When the road and underpass solution were discussed in 
more detail, the RA EIA coordinator said that the geotechnology was difficult due to the 
high groundwater table and that there was a risk of snow drifting in winter; she said that 
‘The Rail Administration has a problem, since it [i.e., the road] will go under and ge-
otechnology does not want that’. Some pictures were shown to illustrate what a road 
bridge over the railway would look like. The bridge depicted was said to be six metres 
high. The RA EIA coordinator, when looking at the pictures, said, ‘I feel that the bridge 
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gets [visual] support from the terrain behind it, if you look at it from the perspective of 
the meadows’.  
This marked an important shift from the earlier position that a huge road bridge 
would be devastating to the landscape view. The initial argument in the rail investigation 
was that the landscape was an invaluable asset that must be protected, so an underpass 
was decided on for road 2018; a highly visible and aesthetically dominant construction 
such as a road bridge was deemed out of the question. The municipal official supported 
the new perspective on the road bridge as no longer in contradiction with the landscape, 
by saying that the solution for road 2018 was ‘not a big issue’ for the municipality. The 
RA chair then asked the County Administrative Board official the critical question, name-
ly, what he thought about the matter, but did not receive an answer. This juncture marked 
a turning point for the decision about what to do with the 2018 crossing: the County Ad-
ministrative Board, which, in the railway investigation, had expressed such strong con-
cern for safeguarding the open landscape north of Upland, was now silent. Discussion 
continued about how to deal with road 2018, and the government officials from the Coun-
ty Administrative Board and the municipality clearly had no interest in starting a dispute 
over the solution for 2018.  
At the project meeting three weeks later on 18 December 2007, the possibility of an 
additional public consultation with local stakeholders regarding road 2018 was discussed, 
but no date was mentioned. The RA project leader hinted that a decision on road 2018 
was going to be made by the administration ‘this week’. The discussion about road 2018 
continued at the project meeting on 29 January 2008, when the RA project leader an-
nounced that the administration had decided that road 2018 would cross over the rail 
track on a bridge. She also acknowledged that the other principal agents, the Road Ad-
ministration and the County Administrative Board, had not yet taken a position: ‘We will 
go over! The Road Administration is looking into this. The County Administrative Board 
is looking into it. If the County Administrative Board says stop, we have to accept that’. 
A public consultation meeting with local stakeholders regarding road 2018 was again on 
the agenda, but it was now discussed whether an additional consultation was actually 
needed; this could be taken to mean that, since other key actors were leaning towards the 
bridge crossing, no additional support from local stakeholders would be needed. At the 
reference group meeting a month later on 29 February 2008, some time was spent dis-
cussing road 2018, and it was announced that consultations with local stakeholders had 
been held. The RA project leader then summarized the decision problem: ‘We recognize 
that it is not good to go under. We have lowered the profile [of the line] in this area. The 
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geotechnological conditions are not good. There is a lot of water. And then there is the 
landscape. So we will go over instead. We have reported to the County Administrative 
Board and, luckily enough, the County Administrative Board has the same view’. The 
County Administrative Board official supported the project leader by stating that the issue 
of the open landscape had been reconsidered by the Board: ‘To dwell on landscape values 
– nothing to quarrel about’. The municipal official in charge of environmental monitor-
ing, however, made the point that road 2018 constituted a delicate matter for the munici-
pality due to local public concern.  
Reopening and closing the decision on 2018 
At this point, the road 2018 question seemed to have been settled in the project. The 
County Administrative Board was not prepared to fight the bridge proposal for road 2018 
by advocating the protection of landscape values, which was what the RA officials had 
feared. The controversy between the geotechnical experts and the project leadership could 
then be resolved when it became clear that the County Administrative Board was unwill-
ing to oppose the project on this issue. 
Initially, the road 2018 underpass alternative, advocated by the County Administra-
tive Board in the railway investigation phase to protect the open landscape, was not re-
considered in the railway planning project. Although the geotechnological experts voiced 
reservation about this alternative in the beginning, the technical arguments alone were not 
strong enough to reopen the decision at this juncture. A problem built up in the EIA pub-
lic consultation processes when it became clear that the local stakeholders had strong 
arguments against the underpass (i.e., risks of flooding and snow drifting), arguments that 
reinforced the geotechnical arguments (i.e., high groundwater table, complicated and 
expensive technology, and uncertainty about the construction process). Resistance to the 
underpass solution from both the technical experts and the local stakeholders had built up 
and was becoming difficult to manage. A problem for the project was that the County 
Administrative Board was understood to be very much in favour of the underpass since it 
wanted to protect the open landscape from the intrusion of a highly visible road overpass.  
At the February 2008 reference group meeting the matter was closed, since it was 
clear that the County Administrative Board was unwilling to make an issue of protecting 
the open landscape. The County Administrative Board had come to a point at which it 
had to prioritize between a) protecting the open landscape and b) commitment to the rail-
way planning project. These two objectives were not in conflict in the railway investiga-
tion phase. The conflict emerged and mounted in the railway planning stage, when more 
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detailed planning decisions were considered and when the board prioritized commitment 
to the project rather than the landscape. The ‘stable alignment’ (Suchman 2000) of the 
project was thereby resumed; the agents tacitly agreed that the decision that road 2018 
should go under the railway line was reopened and a new decision was made: that it 
should go over. The decision, however, was not explicitly reopened. Instead, there was a 
transition from one decision state to another; arguments built up opposing the original 
decision, and agents organized to promote an alternative. When it was established that no 
forceful agents opposed the bridge alternative, choosing the bridge was established as a 
necessary step to continuing the project planning. So the reopened decision was not the 
outcome of a decision but of a changed decision context; the question of road 2018 be-
came embedded in a different context, creating a new choice horizon and demanding 
another solution.  
Concluding discussion 
This case study illustrates how railway planning decision making involving officials, 
consultants, and experts, organized within a highly regulated administrative setting char-
acterized by strong demands for efficiency and legality, emerges through interaction and 
anticipation of the intention of Others. Expert competencies as well as stakeholder inter-
ests and priorities are negotiated and balanced in accordance with an administrative logic 
of efficiency, i.e., producing predefined outcomes given a set budget and timeframe and 
following standardized rules. In this setting, decisions develop, interact, and are redefined 
(Langley et al. 1995, p. 276) as negotiated interim achievements rather than definite final 
choices resulting from a rational process of assessing identified decision alternatives in 
accordance with set preferences, as assumed by normative social science planning theory.  
The establishment of a socio–technical order achieving a temporarily stable organiza-
tional alignment between arrays of elements is decisive for the development of the plan-
ning process. In railway planning, along with other technical infrastructure such as bridg-
es, ‘material stability is inseparable … from the networks of social practice – of design, 
construction, maintenance and use – that must be put into place’ (Suchman 2000, p. 316). 
Decisions serve to stabilize the project in terms of agreements on design, construction, 
technical solutions, modes of cooperation and responsibility, and schedule. All these de-
cisions fit together, so that reopening one could well change the project significantly.  
Carrying out a complex joint action as an instance of cooperative activity requires 
some basic conditions for success (Bratman 1992, p. 328): Agents must trust that they are 
responsive to each other’s intentions; they must be committed to supporting and helping 
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each other carry out the joint activity to realize a common goal. Communication between 
participants (i.e., stakeholders and planners) is therefore crucial in railway planning. The 
actors must continually review their actions and ensure that the mutual responsiveness – 
the joint commitment to mutual support that conditions their joint activity – still exists. 
For the joint activity to continue, they also depend on continuous updates regarding the 
intentions and plans of the other actors in order to continue their own planning. In com-
plex joint actions, decisions derive from negotiated agreements between various organiza-
tional agents that are reached only after considerable time and effort. This means, as the 
present case illustrates, that strong commitment underlies decisions. Apart from the for-
mal and technical problems of reopening decisions, social and communicational conse-
quences, such as loss of trust, arise from breaking agreements and violating commitments 
(Bratman 1999).  
The public administration literature treats accountability as a form of control serving 
to counteract government abuse of power or failure to fulfil public obligations (Gregory 
2003). Public managers are subject to various accountability relationships and face di-
verging accountability expectations; accountability therefore is fluid in that it can shift 
from one relationship to another (Romzek and Ingraham 2000). The production of ‘ac-
counts’ and mutual reference points serves to schematize expectations and manage con-
tingency. In this case of railway decision making, accountability is both specialized and 
general: a planner must satisfy demands for technical, legal, environmental, economic, 
and political accountability and must also be accountable for the project as a unit. A ge-
otechnical expert, for example, regards it as his or her professional duty to identify the 
geotechnical difficulties and risks associated with a particular solution. Accountability is 
produced through talk at meetings, particular lines of reasoning, and comments, and 
through standardized procedures for project administration.  
This study has approached decisions and decision making via an open-ended enquiry 
(Strathern 2000, p. 285) into the flow of social interaction, seeking to understand the 
‘balancing’ of action and accounting, doing and saying. The ethnographic study of deci-
sions, decision processes, and what it means to make decisions can provide a comprehen-
sive understanding of intentionality and context in which ‘the anthropologist’s kind of 
ethnography grasps not just the contingency and unpredictability of social life, then, but 
how description and self-description contribute to it’ (Strathern 2000, p. 287). This ap-
proach sheds light on the practical reasoning (Bratman 1999) occurring in planning deci-
sion making, by conveying the agent and observer perspectives and their interaction in 
producing a social reality.  
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This study examines collective decision making in a public administration context, 
finding decisions to be intrinsically social, dependent on how power relationships are 
understood and influenced by expectations of the intentions of planners (who are co-
decision makers) and by expectations of how decision parameters might be socially con-
strued by stakeholders and other planners. It is from this social context that decision ra-
tionality derives (Flyvbjerg 1998). These findings add to organization research demon-
strating that decisions are interrelated according to a ‘messy’ logic of power rationaliza-
tion rather than a rational pattern of decisions and consequent actions, goals and their 
implementation (see Flyvbjerg 1998). Instances of actors’ ‘strategic agenda building’ 
(Dutton 1986) and ‘issue connectedness’ (Langley et al. 1995, p. 270) make decision 
problems fluid and shifting, depending on how decision makers associate and disassociate 
issues and how they interpret and negotiate decision contexts and processes (Vidaillet 
2008).  
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